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RUUD MUFFELS and DIDIER FOUARGE  
 
THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES  
IN EXPLAINING RESOURCES DEPRIVATION  
ABSTRACT  
In a previous paper in this journal (Headey et al., 2000) a comparison was made 
between three so-called ‘best cases’ of welfare regime types, the ‘Liberal’ US, ‘the 
‘Corporatist’ Germany and the ‘Social-Democratic’ Netherlands. That paper was 
based on the ten-year datasets drawn from the national socio-economic panel 
studies. For this paper we use the unique comparative panel dataset of the European 
Community Household Panel. At the time of research, only three waves of data 
covering the 1994–1996 period were available. Instead of three countries 
representing three different welfare state types as in the earlier paper we cover 
twelve countries allowing us to distinguish a fourth Southern or Mediterranean 
welfare regime type and to compare the performance of the four regimes. 
Compared to the Headey’s et al. paper we focus on the comparative analysis of the 
level of deprivation and pay less attention to income poverty and inequality. 
Because we consider deprivation to be part of the concept of social exclusion (see 
also Atkinson et al., 2002) our results also provide evidence on how welfare 
regimes across the EU cope with social exclusion. The result of the three ‘best-
cases’ study were that the Social-Democratic welfare state performed best on 
nearly all social and economic indicators that were applied. Looking in this paper 
on deprivation levels the results are different and it appears that the Social-
Democratic welfare state is good in preventing income poverty but performs less 
well in equalising levels of deprivation. The results also show that the immature 
Southern welfare states perform worse with respect to preventing deprivation. 
Trying to explain levels of deprivation by estimating Tobit panel regressions it 
turned out that the impact of regime type remains significant though limited. 
Structural disparities between the countries and regimes in terms of economic 
welfare, the demographic structure, and the employment situation explain most of 
the variance across countries.  

 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper draws on empirical data from the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) – covering twelve European countries over the 1994–1996 period – 
to explain the level of deprivation across Europe.1 The paper focuses on the role of 
institutional variations across countries by looking at the impact of country and 
welfare regime type differences. For that purpose, and drawing from the theoretical 
and empirical literature, explanatory models for resources deprivation have been 
developed. Recently, Layte et al. (2001) applied a similar approach, also using 
European panel data, but their approach was primarily oriented at assessing the 
impact of social class and country differences and less so on explaining regime 
type differences.2  
 The paper builds further on the work by Headey et al. (2000) in this journal. 
Rather than using ten-year panel data for three countries as in Headey et al., we use 
three-year data for twelve European countries. Hence, our time horizon is much 
shorter but we cover more countries for which reason it is possible to consider a 
fourth regime type and to compare the performance of these four regimes. It also 
allowed us to test empirically whether or not the regime type clustering makes 
sense in terms of adding explanatory power to our models.  
Background of the study 
The rising inequality in earnings and asset income that the Western world 
witnessed since the mid 1980s and the rising prevalence of extended durations of 
poverty spells show that Kuznets’ (1955) alleged trickle-down theory does not hold 
in many instances. Rising prosperity levels do not mechanically trickle down to the 
poor if it is not that regimes aim purposely to distribute resources more equally to 
the poor. It is for this reason that Headey et al. found that in the ‘Liberal’ US 
welfare state, where the government is much less inclined to pursue redistributive 
policies, the lower half of the income distribution hardly benefited from the fast 
income growth in the last decade. Politicians have to acknowledge that poverty and 
deprivation, be it short-term, transient or persistent, exists even in modern wealthy 
societies. Transient states of poverty should be of less concern to policy makers 
than persistent states since over life-time nearly a majority of the population will 
experience poverty at least once in their life from which they recover soon 
afterwards and never enter again. The concern should be with people entrapted in 
enduring poverty and lasting deprivation because they have hardly any opportunity 
to escape from it. Politicians should therefore be concerned especially with the 
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distributional and temporal aspects of poverty. Even when they believe that 
economic growth might be the best remedy for a country to eradicate poverty, they 
should be increasingly aware that the fruits of economic growth might not trickle 
down unconditionally to the poor. This is likely to be due to all kinds of personal, 
institutional and socio-cultural barriers inflicted upon the poor within society. In 
particular, the interest for the institutional dimensions of poverty is rising.  
 Within the political debate of the late 1980s and 1990s, and the background 
of the influence of the French discourse, it is likely that the term ‘poverty’ has been 
steadily substituted by terms such as social exclusion, social disintegration, and 
social marginalisation (de Haan, 1998). In poverty research the focus is gradually 
shifting from absolute to relative notions and from income poverty and lack of 
basic needs to deprivation and social exclusion and, its counterpart, social 
integration (Atkinson et al., 2002). We define deprivation as enforced lack of a 
number of goods and services, which are rather common in the society in which 
one lives. 
 This restricts the notion of social exclusion to a certain extent. A more 
comprehensive approach has often been followed in the literature, in which social 
exclusion is understood as the denial of the social, political and civil rights of 
citizens in society (Silver, 1994, Walker and Walker, 1997, Byrn, 1999). This more 
theoretical rights-based approach has been translated into an empirical one based 
on the concept of resources deprivation. Such a limitation allows the notion of 
social exclusion to be subjected to empirical study. 
2. WELFARE REGIMES 
With a view to socio-economic policy, arguments abound to conceive each country 
or region as unique and different from each other. However, others believe that 
welfare states come in types and that countries might be treated as belonging to a 
limited set of welfare regime types (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The term welfare 
regime refers to “that larger constellation of socio-economic institutions, policies 
and programmes all oriented toward promoting people’s welfare quite generally” 
(Goodin et al., 1999: p. 5). Regimes represent in this view a particular mode of 
policy intervention, a particular set of intervention strategies, policy tools and a 
particular design of the regulatory or institutional framework. However, these 
regimes must be viewed as ideal-types and there is not likely to be any country that 
fits perfectly in one type (see also Gallie and Paugam, 2000). There is surely much 
variation also within clusters.  
 The idea of welfare regime types refers to Esping-Andersen’s Three worlds 
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of welfare capitalism and his socio-political account of welfare state types. In this 
paper, Esping-Andersen’s classification has been used, albeit in an amended 
version and with recognition of the pitfalls and caveats of his approach. His 
typology has been amended through adding a fourth regime type: the Southern 
welfare regime. For this, credit is paid to authors like Leibfried (1992), Ferrera 
(1996) and Bonoli (1997) who argued that the Southern, Mediterranean countries 
constitute a different welfare regime type with its familial characteristics and its 
immature and selective social security system granting poor benefits and lacking a 
guaranteed minimum benefit system. 
 The recourse to Esping-Andersen’s classification does not, however, imply 
that each country necessarily belongs to one particular regime cluster, nor that the 
classification is independent of the political domains to which the clustering apply 
nor that the belonging to a regime-cluster might not change over time. On the 
contrary it might well be that a country constitutes a ‘hybrid’ case since it does not 
belong to one particular cluster but to more clusters, or that a focus on 
‘employment’, ‘income’, ‘deprivation’ or ‘health’ changes the belonging of 
countries to particular clusters. Particularly over time, regime shifts are quite 
common and reflect a country’s policy change that might imply a radical overhaul 
of the existing welfare system because of which it might move into another regime 
cluster. The Netherlands could be exemplary for such a shift since the Dutch 
welfare state might be characterised as having been primarily a Corporatist 
‘breadwinner state’ in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s (passive labour market 
policies and low female labour market participation) oriented at stabilising the 
labour income of the family’s head but changing its policies quite strongly 
thereafter. Dutch labour market and employment policies became more active in 
the spirit of what Social-Democratic policy-makers advocate as promoting the 
‘right to work’. During the 1980s and 1990s, social security policies also became 
stricter by tightening the eligibility rules for receiving benefits, downsizing the 
benefit levels and shortening their duration, but at the same time safeguarding the 
principles of equality, uniformity and universality. Regime-types might, therefore, 
be a dynamic concept – and not a stable feature of a country’s socio-economic 
policy – that requires continuous scrutiny to test its current value. 
 One of the countries of concern within Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) 
classification is Ireland, which has been put within the Liberal cluster. It could be 
argued that Ireland does not fit in the Liberal type particularly because it shares the 
features of a breadwinner type of social security system as well as a Southern 
regime-type due to its familial characteristics. Some authors, therefore, believe that 
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it belongs to a hybrid type of welfare state that does not fit in either type. Another 
country of concern in this respect is Italy, considered by Esping-Andersen to be a 
Corporatist country but sharing in many respects the features of a Catholic, familial 
Southern regime. Because of the focus on ‘life-style deprivation’, in this chapter 
one might expect Italy to reflect a diverse picture in terms of resources deprivation, 
especially across the rich Northern and poor Southern region. The Southern part of 
Italy would then be more likely to be classified under the Southern familial type of 
regime whereas the Northern part seems to fit better in the Corporatist cluster. 
Some authors, therefore, presume that also Italy constitutes a hybrid case (Gelissen, 
2002). In order to avoid the inclusion of Ireland and Italy in a hybrid type it was 
decided to keep Ireland under the same Liberal heading as Great Britain and to put 
Italy, as Esping-Andersen did, under the Corporatist heading. Countries like 
Germany, Belgium, France, Austria, Luxembourg and Italy, then, belong to a 
continental Corporatist type of welfare state and the Netherlands and Denmark 
were classified in the Social-Democratic regime cluster. The Southern cluster, thus, 
consists of Spain, Greece and Portugal.  
 Whether or not such a clustering makes sense empirically or not has been 
tested, using the three-wave European panel-data. Such a test may reveal how well 
the regime clustering is capable of capturing the unique features of each country in 
explaining levels of income and consumption deprivation across Europe.  
3. RESOURCES DEPRIVATION 
Within the ECHP much information is collected about the life resources of people, 
such as the possession of durables by the household, the health status of adult 
household members, the financial position of the head and the partner, housing 
conditions, and so on. From this list of life style indicators, a relative deprivation 
index has been constructed. Our aim is to measure people’s objective status of 
deprivation defined as being deprived of a minimum level of resources that is 
required to attain a decent living. Henceforth, only items that measure people’s 
objective state of resources deprivation were considered. The approach adopted 
here resembles the notion of ‘enforced lack of necessities’ by Mack and Lansley 
(1985) and especially the ‘life-style deprivation’ approach of Callan et al. (1996) 
and Layte et al. (2001). 
 The list of items in the deprivation index is not limited to monetary items. It 
contains 21 items in four resource areas: health conditions, financial stress, housing 
conditions and possession of durables people want but cannot afford. The entire list 
of items is given in Appendix. The 21 items were coded as 1 (deprived of that item) 
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or 0 (not deprived of that item). The deprivation score is the weighted sum of the 
deprivation scores over the 21 items. The weights applied correspond to the 
proportion of ‘haves’ (not deprived) in the country. The idea behind the weighting 
scheme is that the extent of relative deprivation for an individual increases, the 
larger the share of people who actually ‘have’ the item the individual is lacking. 
This follows Runciman’s (1966) definition of deprivation according to which a 
person feels more deprived the more he sees other people as better off. Lacking a 
trivial item most people have will contribute more to a sense or ‘feeling of 
deprivation’ than lacking an exclusive item almost nobody possesses (Desai and 
Shah, 1988, Muffels, 1993). Since the weights are calculated on the national 
samples, the weighting of deprivation with the proportion of ‘haves’ within the 
population is also likely to diminish the deprivation differences across the 
countries. In this sense the weighting schemes also compensates for cultural 
differences across countries. 
 Although the analyses are performed at the individual level, we only used the 
information on the head of the household and not on the partner to avoid the 
arbitrariness involved in bringing it to a household score. Therefore, the 
deprivation score of the head is assumed to reflect the deprivation situation of all 
household members. This means that, at each wave of the data t, the deprivation 
score for each individual in the sample equals the sum over the items j, weighted 
with the sample proportion of ‘haves’ (ωj) and normalised by dividing Di for each 
person by the sum of the weights over all items j: 
  
100*
1
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∑
∑
=
== J
j j
J
j ijj
i
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ω
,  
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dN
i ij
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∑== 1ω , 
 
where N is the total sample size and J the number of deprivation items (21). The 
deprivation index is multiplied by 100 so that it can easily be interpreted as the 
percentage of consumption items the person misses. Hence, [100,0[∈iD  (0 if a 
person misses no items and Di approaching 100 – but never 100 – if a person 
misses all items while everyone else possesses them). The results for 1996 are 
presented in Table I. In the table, we also report the percentage of those in poverty, 
the level of income inequality and the correlation between standardised income and 
our measure of deprivation.3 
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 The findings in Table I reveal some remarkable facts about how countries 
and welfare state regimes deal with inequality of outcomes in terms of poverty and 
deprivation. The mean level of deprivation displays a great level of variation 
between countries even within the regime clusters of countries. However, it is 
apparent that a great deal of this variation is still maintained when we look purely 
at the regime type effects. The level of deprivation is largest in Southern European 
regimes (where the population misses an average of 15.4 percent of all item), next 
largest in the Liberal regime and lowest in the Social-Democratic regime. In those 
regimes, the population misses an average of, respectively, 15.4, 10 and 5.5 percent 
of all item. This is in line with the findings for income poverty and also 
corroborates the findings of Headey at al. (2000). Confirming our expectations with 
respect to the Southern regime, that regime is clearly performing worse compared 
to any of the other regimes in mitigating inequality of outcomes. This confirms our 
hypothesis that the Southern regime should be considered a distinct regime type. 
 
TABLE I 
Mean deprivation index, inequality of deprivation, percentage in poverty and 
income inequality, 1996 
 Mean 
deprivation 
Inequality of 
deprivationa 
Percentage 
in poverty 
Inequality of 
incomea 
Correlation 
between 
income and 
deprivation 
Corporatist 8.3 1.324 11.6 0.632 -0.324 
Germany 6.7 1.524 11.7 0.560 -0.291 
Belgium 7.6 1.509 11.4 0.578 -0.268 
Luxembourg 5.2 1.769 6.1 0.554 -0.255 
France 9.0 1.261 9.2 0.612 -0.347 
Italy 10.1 1.134 14.0 0.745 -0.302 
Social-Democratic 5.5 1.568 7.7 0.639 -0.242 
Denmark 6.1 1.359 6.1 0.500 -0.218 
The Netherlands 5.2 1.653 8.2 0.686 -0.254 
Liberal 10.0 1.257 11.6 0.725 -0.350 
Great Britain 9.9 1.255 11.8 0.722 -0.349 
Ireland 10.3 1.284 8.3 0.735 -0.359 
Southern 15.4 0.889 14.0 0.717 -0.431 
Greece 19.3 0.676 15.2 0.709 -0.427 
Spain 13.0 0.957 13.3 0.697 -0.426 
Portugal 20.4 0.799 15.2 0.805 -0.434 
EU 9.7 1.242 11.8 0.681 -0.323 
a: inequality is measured by the coefficient of variation 
Source: ECHP, Wave 3, 1996, own calculations. 
 
 The picture with respect to the dispersion in deprivation is, however, rather 
different. The dispersion of resources deprivation is about twice as large as the 
dispersion of income, which is at first sight remarkable considering the fact that the 
score on the deprivation index might be viewed as reflecting at least partly the 
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longer-term consumption status of household. This finding clearly suggests that the 
resources deprivation yardstick based on a lifestyle index is rather different from 
measures based on income. Countries belonging to the Social-Democratic regime 
type display now the highest level of inequality in the level of deprivation, and 
those in the Southern regime the lowest. This is contradictory to our expectation 
because we suspected that a high level of monetary resources would also trigger the 
possession of resources in the non-monetary domain. This does not seem to be true. 
The findings for the Liberal and Corporatist regime show that they perform equally 
well, though the differences across the countries within the latter regime type are 
large and larger than the differences in income inequality. Also this reconfirms the 
conclusion that income alone is not sufficient to explain levels of deprivation and 
that deprivation measures something else than just financial strain. The findings for 
the correlation between income and resources deprivation suggest that both 
measures are most closely negatively associated in Southern welfare regimes. That 
the association however is far from perfect (-0.4) explains why the income 
inequality in Southern regimes can be rather high and the deprivation inequality 
nonetheless low. The correlation is lowest in the Social-Democratic welfare regime 
indicating that a high income is less of a guarantee for a low level of deprivation 
than in the other regimes. This explains why for this regime the outcomes for 
income inequality are so much different from the ones for deprivation inequality.  
 Because our primary interest is to explain variations in the level of 
deprivation, we developed an empirical model for deprivation. The variables 
included in the model reflect the personal and household characteristics, 
differences in needs, household formation and socio-economic events, as well as 
country and welfare regime type dummies (see Section 4). The choice for these 
variables very much resembles the findings of a number of empirical studies on 
deprivation over the last decade in Europe (see Layte et al., 2001). Although our 
deprivation indicator is a continuous one, it only takes values in the 0–100 interval. 
The minimum value of 0 is a censoring point: considering the whole sample, 35 
percent has a deprivation level equal to 0 (see Table A.I in Appendix). It is 
however clear that these persons do not enjoy the same level of welfare. In other 
words, there is variation in the level of welfare that is not accounted for by our 
indicator. In this context, standard OLS estimation would not reflect the structure 
of the data. In this paper we therefore model deprivation using the following Tobit 
model: 
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iii XD εβ +=* , 
*
iD  is unobserved, but 0=iD  if 0* ≤iD  
 *ii DD =  if 0* >iD  
 
where *iD  is the true level of deprivation, Xi a vector of explanatory variables, β a 
vector of coefficients including a constant term and εi a random normal error term 
with mean 0 and variance 2σˆ . The model was estimated on all individuals present 
in the three waves of the panel (see Section 4). Robust estimators of variance are 
reported in order to account for the fact that the dependent variable is measured at 
the household level. 
 The performance of the models is evaluated by Veall and Zimmermann’s 
(1994: 487) preferred measure for pseudo-R2:  
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4. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
The question to be dealt with is whether or not welfare regimes matter at all in 
explaining differences in resources deprivation levels across countries. We can 
derive the most important factors at stake in explaining levels of deprivation from 
the rich literature on social and economic inequality and poverty. Among others, 
we could review a few of the most relevant theoretical underpinnings for the issue 
at stake. Well-known and extremely important in this respect is human capital 
theory. This theory predicts that the distribution of advantage and disadvantage in 
society is strongly associated with the human capital endowments built up during 
the various stages in life at school (education), in social networks (preschool and 
social learning) and at work (‘on the job’ learning). Another related economic 
theory is job search theory which pays particular attention to the temporal and 
institutional factors involved in the job search process itself which might be held 
responsible for the realisation of successful ‘job matches’ on the labour market and, 
therewith, on the distribution of well-being during lifetime. The sociological and 
increasingly influential life course theory – that is narrowly linked to modernisation 
theory – states that the occurrence of biographical life events such as marriage, 
childbirth, divorce, migration and death act as triggers for economic success and 
failure in the various stages of life and, therewith, for the socio-economic fate of 
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people during life.5 The classical theory on social mobility and social stratification 
points to factors such as social position and social class, inherited wealth and 
social background for the explanation of social success and upward social 
mobility. In the literature on poverty and deprivation, reference is directly or 
indirectly made to these general theories for selecting the factors that might explain 
the occurrence of different forms of poverty in society.  
 From the literature on deprivation the following factors might be used and 
implemented in our models given the limitations of the dataset: 
1. Personal and household characteristics determining individual preferences:  
Personal characteristics are included to account for differences in taste and 
individual preferences that might affect the reported and experienced level of 
deprivation. Apart from the head’s age and sex in the various models, age squared 
is included to allow for the possibility that the relationship between deprivation and 
age is a U-shaped or saddle shaped pattern with deprivation initially decreasing 
with increasing age but increasing again after a certain age threshold.  
2. Needs differences, determined by household size and household structure:  
We expect resources deprivation to be affected by the needs of the household. 
Welfare economic theory states that due to ‘economies of scale’ the household’s 
welfare is affected by the sheer size and composition of the household, i.e. the 
number and age of adults and living-in children. The marital status variable 
(dummies for married, single, divorced) is included here to reflect the life stage 
people are in. It is likely to affect their needs due to the impact of the scale factor as 
well as the impact of a shared household budget management practice.  
3. Household formation and dissolution events reflecting the ‘biographisation’ of 
poverty: 
These variables capture the impact of life biography events, which are believed to 
trigger the processes for moving into or for escaping from deprivation. Since we 
have data for three years we were able to assess empirically whether or not such a 
life event (marriage, separation, childbirth and children moving in or leaving home) 
has taken place between 1994 (the first interview date) and 1996 (the last interview 
date). Dummies were included in the model to capture these life events (more or 
less adults, more or less children). The reference group were households with no 
change in the number of adults or children between 1994 and 1996. 
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4. Socio-economic position indicated by employment status and human capital 
endowments:6 
Socio-economic status, is presumed to play a significant role in explaining 
deprivation. It combines the likely impact of human capital endowments measured 
by education level with the impact of the current employment status and 
(un)employment history on deprivation. This factor refers to the role of the labour 
market in preventing and resolving situations of deprivation whose likely impact 
has been stressed by many authors. We have included two education level dummies 
for a high or low education level (the medium level acts as the reference category) 
and one dummy for being involved in ‘on the job’ training. Next, we included 
dummies to assess whether or not people had some experience with unemployment  
in the last five years prior to the interview. To account for other relevant factors 
affecting the labour market position a factor is used to deal with being involved in 
household and caring duties and a dummy variable for retired people. 
5. Labour market status and labour market events: 
A variable indicating the ‘longitudinal employment status’ is included in the 
models. The longitudinal employment status variable is aimed at measuring the 
degree to which people are attached to or included in the labour market in the 36 
months prior to the interview in 1996. People are classified as ‘work insecure’ 
when their attachment to the labour market, in terms of the number of months 
being employed, is less than 100 percent of the number of months available for 
work, but more than 50 percent. People are called ‘partially excluded’ when they 
work between 0–50 percent of all the months available for work, but at least one 
month. People are considered ‘fully excluded’ if they do not work at all during the 
three-year period. The reference category consists of people ‘fully employed’ 
during the three-year period. This variable allows the changes in employment status 
to be captured during the years prior to the interview date (see also Muffels and 
Fouarge, 2002). Obviously, the use of this information requires that we only 
consider the individuals who were present in all three waves of the data. 
6. The income position of the household:  
The question to what extent resources deprivation is affected by the income 
position might be answered by considering the past income status of the 
respondent. The obvious idea is that the higher past or lagged income is, the lower 
resources deprivation will be. Furthermore, it might be that the deprivation 
situation is particularly affected by previous spells of income poverty, which 
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presumably exaggerate experiences of financial stress and economic strain. For this 
reason, in our models a variable for past equivalent income is included as well as a 
variable measuring the past income poverty status of the household. Past income is 
the average equivalent income over the three years prior to the date at which 
deprivation is measured. It is taken to be a measurement for people’s permanent 
income. Past poverty is measured by the frequency of poverty hits in the previous 
three-year period (poverty ‘hit-rate’). Again, using this measure of permanent 
income implies that we only use the longitudinal sample. 
7. Institutional differences related to the particular set-up of national policies: 
Finally, regime type dummies are included in the model to allow for variations in 
policies and institutional designs that are likely to affect the distribution of 
deprivation in society. Earlier, it was stated that the possibility of significant 
interaction effects between ‘regime type’ and other factors cannot be ruled out.  
In the model we will include interaction effects that might capture the 
dissimilarities in the socio-economic and socio-cultural context. In the model we 
want to account for differences in the demographic composition (household size), 
the employment structure (a dummy for being fully excluded from the labour 
market or not; the employed act as the reference category) and the income 
distribution (equivalent income). Hence, interaction variables were created between 
three regime types (the Corporatist regime is taken as the reference category) and 
these four structural variables.  
 
 The factors listed under 1 to 7 are assumed to reflect the common – not to 
country or regime-related – structural, causal factors that determine the deprivation 
levels across all European countries. In the models to be estimated, the institutional 
regime type dummies might interact with these structural causal factors and that 
part of the regime type impact must be attributed to these structural regime and 
country-related interaction effects. To the extent that all or parts of the regime 
effects are captured through the inclusion of these interaction effects, the estimation 
results show to what extent the regime type effects are sustained or not. In this 
sense, the model estimations constitute the litmus test for the relevance of the 
regime type classification, sui generis, for explaining income and resources 
deprivation across Europe. In the end it might well be that the estimation results 
show that there is hardly any pure regime type effect in addition to the impact of 
the common structural factors and the interaction effects of these with regime types 
or that its impact is rather small.  
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5. EXPLAINING LEVELS OF DEPRIVATION 
In total, we estimated five models to explain levels of deprivation. The first model 
we estimated is the basic explanatory model without country or regime type 
variables. It includes personal characteristics and needs variables, household 
formation events variables, as well as socio-economic position and labour market 
status variables (Model 1). Further, the model includes information on past income 
and poverty status, because both are expected to be a strong predictor of 
deprivation. In the second model, country dummies were included (Model 2). Next, 
these were replaced with regime-type dummies (Model 3). This allows us to test 
whether the suggested regime-type clustering makes any sense empirically. This 
model was then extended to include interaction effects between regime types and 
needs variables, labour market status and past income (Model 4). Finally, the same 
model was estimated but with country dummies and interaction effects rather than 
regime dummies (Model 5). The results for the first three models are presented in 
Table II. The estimates for Model 4 are presented in Tables III.a and III.b. The 
results of Model 5 are presented in the Appendix.  
 Viewing the outcomes of these models, the household ‘needs’, the head’s 
‘socio-economic position’ and the lagged level of household income are 
undoubtedly the three factors explaining most of the variance in individual levels 
of deprivation. The impact of the household needs reflects the importance of the 
life stage people are in. People in their middle-ages combine the pressure of 
working, learning and caring and if for one or another reason income resources are 
dried up, e.g. because of the loss of work, the level of non-monetary resources will 
also deteriorate. The impact of socio-economic position points to the lack of 
‘capabilities’ and human capital endowments to maintain the household’s position 
in the distribution of monetary as well as non-monetary resources. The impact of 
past experiences of a low income or poverty on deprivation indicates the path 
dependency of situations of hardship during the life cycle. The smaller the flows of 
monetary resources in the past the more likely the household tends to experience 
high levels of deprivation.   
 The results (Model 1) also show a decreasing pattern of deprivation with age. 
This might reflect the impact of accumulated resources and durables on reducing 
levels of deprivation. If people grow older, they tend to accumulate the resources 
and durables required for subsistence. They will also have invested more in 
building up assets (housing, capital) during their life-course. Finally, during their 
life older people have learned to cope with situations of financial stress (e.g. 
through increasing their earnings). As to the effect of gender, we find that other 
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things being equal, female-headed households display higher levels of deprivation 
than male-headed households. Partly, this is due to the consequences of divorce 
and separation events, which for women seem to have stronger negative effects on 
their life conditions than for men. The dummy variable for lone parents also 
indicates that persons in such families are significantly more likely to be deprived. 
These results confirm the conjectures generally made about the feminisation of 
poverty.  
 The household size (number of adults and number of children), which is 
taken to reflect the needs of the household, is a strong determinant of consumption 
deprivation. Living in a larger household will increase the level of deprivation. The 
impact of household formation events on deprivation is found to be significant. As 
the study of Goodin et al. (1999) already has shown, separation implies a higher 
risk of entering income poverty for those it concerns. The findings here suggest 
that divorced or separated people also seem to have less non-monetary resources 
and that they are more likely to be deprived than married persons, and so are 
singles. This outcome reveals that marriage is a warrant for keeping deprivation 
down. A household formation event like an adult leaving the household during the 
observation period is also associated with higher levels of deprivation. This is 
because such an event will often lead to diminishing resources. The arrival of 
young children or grown-up children in the household – through birth or because a 
child moves in – is likely to have a similar negative impact on the family’s living 
conditions. However, if dependent children leave the household the level of 
deprivation seems to decrease, though this effect is insignificant.  
 Important though these needs and household formation variables are, they are 
of less weight than the socio-economic variables. These reflect the traditional 
impact of education, social status and labour market position on the economic 
conditions and lifestyles of people in society. They indicate that equality in terms 
of outcomes is very much dependent on the distribution of opportunities and 
human resources. The presumptions of human capital theory that a higher 
education reduces deprivation and improves the life prospects of people are firmly 
confirmed. Though the effect of a higher level of education is strong, the reverse 
and stronger effect of a low education level on deprivation is even more striking. 
For the same reason, being involved in education or training programmes within or 
outside the firm strongly lowers the deprivation level. 
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TABLE II 
Results of estimation of three regression models for resources deprivation in 1996, 
Tobit regressions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
N = 79,385 β abs. t-val β abs. t-val β abs. t-val 
Constant 89.088 [13.17]** 78.196 [11.54]** 80.454 [12.18]**
Personal characteristics    
Head’s age -0.366 [5.34]** -0.362 [5.32]** -0.336 [4.93]**
Head’s age squared 0.353 [5.01]** 0.354 [5.07]** 0.336 [4.79]**
Female head 1.897 [5.28]** 1.891 [5.25]** 1.894 [5.34]**
Needs variables and household formation 
N of adults 0.661 [5.01]** 0.563 [4.59]** 0.309 [2.47]*
N of children 0.908 [5.20]** 0.999 [5.75]** 0.958 [5.50]**
Separated (ref=married) 2.637 [3.71]** 2.293 [3.28]** 2.264 [3.23]**
Single 4.474 [6.34]** 5.092 [7.33]** 4.894 [7.03]**
Lone parent 5.895 [5.67]** 5.709 [5.60]** 5.854 [5.72]**
Less adults 0.890 [2.49]* 0.871 [2.50]* 0.779 [2.21]*
More children 1.711 [3.25]** 1.471 [2.87]** 1.646 [3.18]**
Less children -0.364 [0.88] -0.202 [0.49] 0.111 [0.27] 
Socio-economic status    
Unemployment history 3.283 [9.47]** 3.367 [9.84]** 2.976 [8.71]**
Retired -2.119 [3.57]** -2.299 [3.92]** -2.139 [3.66]**
Homework/caring duties -2.918 [5.66]** -2.755 [5.44]** -2.850 [5.61]**
High education (ref=average educ) -0.932 [2.48]* -1.577 [4.21]** -1.591 [4.21]**
Low education 3.851 [12.91]** 3.174 [10.91]** 3.091 [10.65]**
In training -3.893 [6.33]** -3.674 [6.08]** -3.597 [5.94]**
Long-term employment status (ref=fully employed, 3 waves) 
Work insecure 2.339 [6.17]** 2.368 [6.37]** 2.474 [6.64]**
Partially excluded 3.939 [8.03]** 4.193 [8.70]** 3.974 [8.24]**
Fully excluded 4.248 [8.42]** 4.563 [9.17]** 4.161 [8.39]**
Past income and poverty status       
Log of permanent income, 3 waves -8.733 [12.61]** -7.643 [11.11]** -7.855 [11.67]**
Poverty hit-rate -0.114 [0.34] 0.324 [0.96] 0.274 [0.82] 
Country dummies (ref=Germany)   
Belgium   -3.626 [7.10]**   
Luxembourg   -25.952 [33.53]**   
France   2.049 [4.83]**   
Italy   -0.377 [0.81]   
Denmark   -6.356 [13.32]**   
The Netherlands   -8.779 [18.12]**   
Great Britain   2.745 [5.11]**   
Ireland   -7.204 [14.69]**   
Greece   10.558 [21.55]**   
Spain   1.812 [3.74]**   
Portugal   8.080 [13.92]**   
Regime type (ref=Corporatist)   
Liberal     1.995 [4.80]**
Social-Democratic     -8.306 [28.61]**
Southern     4.443 [15.81]**
Pseudo-R2 0.370  0.497  0.435  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust estimator of variance  
Source: ECHP, Waves 1–3 (1994–1996). 
 
THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES IN EXPLAINING RESOURCES DEPRIVATION 
 
17
 The longitudinal employment status has a strong impact on the level of 
deprivation. The longer people are excluded from the labour market in the 36 
months prior to the interview date, the more likely they are to be deprived. The 
more people have a secure and stable work history, the less deprived they are. This 
is corroborated by the significant effect of the indicator for having experienced 
unemployment in the past five years. Remarkably, though, caring duties lower the 
deprivation level, probably because the persons involved are married and female 
and are not dependent for their living on their own labour earnings. The equally 
negative signs for retired persons are in line with the effect of age. 
 The effect of our measure of permanent income makes it clear that one is 
very unlikely to experience high levels of deprivation when one’s level of 
permanent income is high. The poverty status variable, however, has no additional 
explanatory power once the permanent income variable has been included.  
 Inclusion of the country dummies (Model 2) does not change much to the 
estimates, but it does increase substantially the explanatory power of the model. 
However powerful and significant the socio-economic characteristics of the 
household are, as being predictors of the deprivation level, there do seem to be 
country specific elements to deprivation. The cross-country differences in 
deprivation found in Table I cannot exclusively be explained by differences in 
people’s social and economic background. The main question of this paper is 
however whether these country differences are unique or that they merely reflect 
regime type effects? Regarding the results for Model 3 – where the country 
indicators were replaced with regime-type dummies – it seems true that regime 
type effects can explain most of the country variance. Comparing Model 2 and 
Model 3, it is shown that the price in terms of explained variance is limited: our 
measure of pseudo-R2 decreases with only 6 percentage points from 0.497 to 0.435. 
Do regime types matter? 
Up to here, we have shown that it seems to make sense to cluster countries in terms 
of regime types. However, it remains to be seen whether the structural effects 
found in the previous estimated models to explain levels of deprivation are not 
common but vary across regime type. This has been tested through adding cross-
terms to the previous models. The estimates are reported in Tables III.a and III.b. 
 Though increasing household sizes, on average, increases deprivation, it 
lowers deprivation in the Social-Democratic and Southern regime compared to the 
Corporatist regime (Table III.b). In the former regime, it is likely to be due to the 
government supporting the larger family (collective solidarity), whereas in the 
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latter it is likely family support (family solidarity) that keeps deprivation low in 
larger families. 
 
TABLE III.a 
Explaining resources deprivation in European welfare regimes, 1996, Tobit 
regressions 
 Model 4 
N = 79,385 β abs. t-val 
Constant 67.826 [9.45]** 
Personal characteristics  
Head’s age -0.332 [4.90]** 
Head’s age squared 0.325 [4.68]** 
Female head 1.909 [5.45]** 
Needs variables and household formation 
N of adults 0.620 [3.55]** 
N of children 1.065 [5.17]** 
Separated (ref=married) 2.456 [2.71]** 
Single 4.906 [6.99]** 
Lone parent 5.610 [5.50]** 
Less adults 0.886 [2.55]* 
More children 1.803 [3.51]** 
Less children -0.019 [0.05] 
Socio-economic status  
Unemployment history 2.896 [8.59]** 
Retired -2.086 [3.57]** 
Homework/caring duties -2.765 [5.54]** 
High education (ref=average educ) -1.420 [3.92]** 
Low education 2.931 [10.33]** 
In training -3.465 [5.74]** 
Long-term employment status (ref=fully employed, 3 waves) 
Work insecure 2.446 [6.57]** 
Partially excluded 3.804 [8.02]** 
Fully excluded 4.351 [7.39]** 
Past income and poverty status   
Log of permanent income, 3 waves -6.574 [9.11]** 
Poverty hit-rate 0.203 [0.67] 
Regime type (ref=Corporatist) 
Liberal 41.802 [4.10]** 
Social-Democratic 7.723 [0.87] 
Southern 44.110 [8.00]** 
Interaction effects See Table III.b 
Pseudo-R2 0.455  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust estimator of variance  
Source: ECHP, Waves 1–3 (1994–1996). 
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TABLE III.b 
Regime effects for the interaction variables, continuation of Table II.a 
 Model 4 
 β abs. t-val 
Household size (ref=Corporatist)   
Liberal*household size -0.384 [1.18] 
Soc dem*household size  -0.990 [4.43]** 
Southern*household size -0.606 [3.56]** 
Labour market exclusion (ref=Corporatist) 
Liberal*fully excluded 0.387 [0.37] 
Soc dem*fully excluded 2.399 [3.70]** 
Southern*fully excluded -1.724 [3.66]** 
Interaction with permanent income (ref=Corporatist) 
Liberal*permanent income -4.139 [4.04]** 
Soc dem*permanent income -1.498 [1.64] 
Southern*permanent income -4.094 [7.31]** 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust estimator of variance  
Source: ECHP, Waves 1–3 (1994–1996). 
  
 Whereas being excluded from the labour market raises deprivation across all 
regimes it leads to less deprivation in the Southern regime. This perverse effect 
might be due to the larger role of the ‘informal’ sector particularly for people 
excluded from the labour market. A similar effect was found in Muffels and 
Fouarge (2002). The positive and significant effect for the Social-Democratic 
regime shows that being persistently excluded from the labour market has a 
stronger impact on deprivation than in the Corporatist regimes. Together with the 
insignificant effect of permanent income on reducing deprivation in the Social-
Democratic regime, it tempt us to conclude that the high level of income protection 
generally offered in the Social-Democratic welfare regime is not a sufficient 
strategy to cope with deprivation. Viewing the outcomes of the level of permanent 
income for the other regimes it turned out that its effect on reducing deprivation is 
generally larger and stronger in the Liberal and Southern regimes than in the 
Corporatist ones. 
 While the effects and significance of the covariates remain stable across the 
various models estimated, the pure regime effects are affected by the inclusion of 
the cross-terms with permanent income. The Southern and the Liberal regime 
consistently appear to have larger levels of deprivation than the Corporatist welfare 
regime. The sign for the egalitarian Social-Democratic regime is, indeed, negative 
in Model 3, indicating that deprivation is lower than in the Corporatist regime. 
However, this effect is suppressed and becomes insignificant once we include the 
interaction effect with permanent income as in Model 4. One important conclusion 
therefore is that the magnitude and significance of the effects of regime types on 
deprivation appears to be mediated through permanent income. This is particularly 
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the case for the Social-Democratic regime type. It implies that the Social-
Democratic welfare state’s efforts towards guaranteeing income stability over time 
do not have additional pay-offs in terms of the reduction of deprivation.  
 Our analyses show that notwithstanding taking account of a lot of, at first 
sight, important interaction effects with compositional differences, regime effects 
remain significant. The contribution of regime type to explaining the total variance 
across the population is not that large, even when we leave out the interaction 
effects, but they seem to capture most of the variance caused by the sheer country 
differences. The last model estimated is similar to Model 4, but the regime type 
dummies as well as the interaction effects were replaced with country dummies. 
The results of this so-called ‘country model’ (Model 5) are presented in Appendix 
(Table A.II). If the explained variance of both models is compared, it can be seen 
that Model 4 explains as much as 88 percent of the variance explained by the 
model with country dummies. The conclusion drawn from this is that though 
structural (compositional) factors play a more dominant role in explaining 
differences in deprivation levels, the effect of regime type remained significant and 
substantial. The results showing that ‘regimes’ matter in explaining non-monetary 
deprivation demonstrate that the notion of regimes might bring some more light in 
the ‘dark forest’ rather than causing the researcher to be lost in the ‘myriad of 
unique (country) trees’. If we follow Atkinson et al. (2002) in claiming that apart 
from monetary indicators non-monetary indicators are important in their own right 
to measure the social performance of welfare states in tackling social exclusion 
then the notion of ‘regimes’ certainly contributes to explaining the performance of 
countries in preventing social exclusion.  
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This paper focuses on explaining resources deprivation that is considered a 
measure for multidimensional poverty. The measure for resources deprivation 
departs from a selected list of social indicators as implemented in the European 
Community Household panel survey (see Appendix). It combines monetary and 
non-monetary indicators and resembles in part the approach to measure social 
exclusion adopted by a working group set up under auspices of the Belgium 
presidency (Atkinson et al., 2002). To be more precise, the term resources 
deprivation we use here is defined as a state of enforced lack of resources, which 
are fairly common in the lifestyles of people in the society where they live. The 
dimensions underlying the concept might be manifold but the panel data of the 
European Community puts severe restrictions on the sort of dimensions that might 
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be distinguished. In this study, four of them have been used: health; financial 
stress; housing and the possession of durables that people want but cannot afford. 
The basic idea was to construct an indicator of resources deprivation (consumption 
of durables and life style goods) using micro data for the 1990s. The second aim of 
the paper was to explain levels of resources deprivation across welfare regimes by 
estimating Tobit regression models. The primary focus has been on the impact of 
institutional variables translated into the impact of welfare regime types on 
resources deprivation.  
 The finding that the dispersion in the distribution of resources deprivation is 
larger in the egalitarian regimes tempts us to conclude that attaining income 
equality does not mean that inequalities in other domains of life are also 
successfully tackled by these regimes. The concepts of income and resources 
deprivation are clearly associated but instead of being substitutes they have to be 
considered as being complementary, each focusing on different dimensions of the 
lifestyles of people in society. It is for that reason that the performance of regimes 
in tackling income poverty turns out to be rather different from their performance 
in tackling resources deprivation though there remains a clear association between 
the two performance indicators. 
 Looking at the difference across regime types it became clear that deprivation 
poverty tends to be more prevalent in Southern and Liberal regimes and less so in 
Corporatist and Social-Democratic regimes. We take this as evidence for our 
assertion that welfare regimes matter in explaining differences in resources 
deprivation across countries. In the full model, with the inclusion of a broad set of 
theoretically inferred indicators, the regime type model performed rather well and 
explained 88 percent of the total variance explained by the country model.  
 Nonetheless, we found that most of the variance is not explained by country 
or regime type differences but by common structural factors like the needs of the 
household, the human capital of its members, the turnover and dynamics on the 
labour market and the distribution of permanent income. Particularly interesting is 
the large contribution of socio-economic status variables to explaining deprivation, 
which reflects the traditional impact of class, education and employment status. 
This suggests that inequality in terms of outcomes ultimately depends on the 
distribution of resources and opportunities (human capital, health, employment 
creation and destruction, inherited wealth, and so on). The interaction effects with 
needs variables (household size, separation), socio-economic status and long-term 
income did not level out the effects of regime type. On the contrary, the effect of 
regime type remained significant in the full model particularly for the Liberal and 
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the Southern welfare regimes.   
Policy implications 
By way of conclusion, the assertion was made that common structural factors 
obviously play a larger role in explaining differences in deprivation levels across 
Europe than regime type effects. However true this might be from an analytical 
perspective, from a policy perspective, one should keep in mind that regime types 
should not erroneously be believed to be stable features of a country’s policy but 
instead a dynamic reality that requires continued scrutiny to test its heuristic and 
practical value in an increasingly dynamic economic and social context.  
 Although past income is a strong determinant of deprivation, the inequality in 
the deprivation distribution is found to be large – and indeed larger than the 
inequality in income. This suggests that policies aimed to fight social exclusion 
should not be limited to income policies. It should be preferable, from a policy 
perspective, to extend their scope to employment policies, health policies, 
education and housing policies. Policies should thus take a broader picture on 
board and focus on the entire set of dimensions underlying the exclusion concept. 
Since the social processes underlying deprivation boil down to the features of the 
broader social and economic order, it requires a good deal of social engineering to 
tackle the perverse equity effects for particular groups in the various domains of 
life. This paper clearly indicates that the social fabric in the various countries is 
designed substantially differently and with different success in the way forward to 
attaining a society with a low level of deprivation. The challenges for social 
policies are quite dissimilar and, therefore, so also are the ways to achieve the goals 
most of the welfare states under scrutiny are prioritising. Some regimes perform 
better in achieving these goals than others though dependent on the sort of 
indicators used. The Social-Democratic regime performs well in spreading income 
poverty risks but far worse in spreading risks of deprivation, defined as being 
deprived of a number of monetary and non-monetary resources. We also found 
support for our conjecture that the Southern regimes, however different they might 
be, perform on average worse in reducing income poverty as well as resources 
deprivation. The main conclusion of the paper, however, is that this finding should 
not primarily be attributed to the design of their social and economic policies 
(regime effect). It can more likely be attributed to structural disparities across 
countries. Such disparities have arisen in the course of time through different paths 
of socio-economic development. They also stem from the whole range of 
economic, social, political and physical assets a society possesses.    
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APPENDIX: INDICATOR FOR RESOURCES DEPRIVATION 
The list of indicators for resources deprivation 
 
Health situation 
1. Health of the person in general; 
2. Person is hampered in daily activities by a physical or mental health problem, 
illness or disability. 
 
Financial stress 
3. Can the household afford keeping you home adequately warm? 
4. Can the household afford paying for a week's annual holiday away from home? 
5. Can the household afford replacing worn-out furniture? 
6. Can the household afford buying new, rather than second-hand, clothes? 
7. Can the household afford eating meat, chicken or fish every second day, if 
wanted? 
8. Can the household afford having friends or family for drink/dinner once a 
month?  
9. Has the household been unable to pay scheduled mortgage payments or rent for 
the accommodation during the past 12 months?  
10. Has the household been unable to pay scheduled utility bills during the past 12 
months? 
11. Has the household been unable to pay purchase hire instalments or other loan 
repayments during the past 12 months?  
 
Housing situation 
12. Does the dwelling have bath or shower? 
13. Does the accommodation have shortage of space? 
14. Does the accommodation have damp walls, floors etc.?  
15. Does the accommodation have rot in window frames or floors? 
 
Possession of durables (not possessing for financial reason) 
16. Possession of a car; 
17. Possession of colour TV; 
18. Possession of a video recorder; 
19. Possession of a micro wave; 
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20. Possession of a dishwasher; 
21. Possession of a telephone. 
Descriptive statistics of deprivation index 
 
TABLE A.I 
Descriptive statistics of deprivation index, 1996 
 Proportion of 
zeros 
Mean value Standard 
deviation 
Maximum 
Germany 50 6.7 10.3 75.5 
Belgium 48 7.6 11.4 70.8 
Luxembourg 62 5.2 9.2 61.4 
France 36 9.0 11.3 85.1 
Italy 25 10.1 11.4 78.9 
Denmark 44 6.1 8.3 71.2 
The Netherlands 57 5.2 8.7 61.7 
United Kingdom 39 9.9 12.5 84.8 
Ireland 38 10.3 13.3 74.1 
Greece 0 19.3 13.0 77.4 
Spain 18 13.0 12.4 83.2 
Portugal 10 20.4 16.3 82.1 
EU 35 9.7 12.0 85.1 
Source: ECHP, Wave 3, 1996, own calculations. 
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TABLE A.II 
Estimates of country model for resources deprivation, 1996, Tobit regressions 
 
 Model 5 
N = 79,385 β abs. t-val 
Constant 61.681 [6.17]** 
Personal characteristics  
Head’s age -0.333 [4.94]** 
Head’s age squared 0.321 [4.63]** 
Female head 1.887 [5.32]** 
Needs variables and household formation 
N of adults 0.008 [0.02] 
N of children 0.399 [1.12] 
Separated (ref=married) 2.180 [3.18]** 
Single 4.541 [6.59]** 
Lone parent 5.192 [5.11]** 
Less adults 1.004 [2.91]** 
More children 1.677 [3.29]** 
Less children -0.228 [0.55] 
Socio-economic status  
Unemployment history 3.210 [9.56]** 
Retired -2.217 [3.71]** 
Homework/caring duties -2.645 [5.28]** 
High education (ref=average educ) -1.116 [3.12]** 
Low education 2.998 [10.43]** 
In training -3.483 [5.81]** 
Long-term employment status (ref=fully employed, 3 waves) 
Work insecure 2.287 [6.21]** 
Partially excluded 3.915 [8.28]** 
Fully excluded 4.914 [4.50]** 
Past income and poverty status   
Log of permanent income, 3 waves -5.778 [5.68]** 
Poverty hit-rate 0.334 [1.19] 
Country dummies (ref=Germany) 
Belgium 14.601 [0.97] 
Luxembourg 178.754 [12.76]** 
France 51.038 [3.56]** 
Italy -9.596 [0.84] 
Denmark 23.612 [1.43] 
The Netherlands 15.444 [1.25] 
Great Britain 43.166 [3.34]** 
Ireland 153.461 [14.99]** 
Greece 36.370 [3.90]** 
Spain 44.465 [4.60]** 
Portugal 41.813 [4.24]** 
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Interaction effects  
Household size  
Belgium * household size 0.328 [0.78] 
Luxembourg * household size -1.735 [4.08]** 
France * household size 0.507 [1.35] 
Italy * household size 1.253 [3.27]** 
Denmark * household size 0.047 [0.12] 
The Netherlands * household size -0.665 [1.70] 
Great Britain * household size 0.479 [1.05] 
Ireland * household size 0.540 [1.57] 
Greece * household size 0.970 [2.87]** 
Spain * household size 0.067 [0.20] 
Portugal * household size 0.890 [2.52]* 
Long-term employment status   
Belgium * fully excluded 0.744 [0.60] 
Luxembourg * fully excluded -13.632 [10.40]** 
France * fully excluded -1.305 [1.19] 
Italy * household size -0.442 [0.42] 
Denmark * fully excluded 3.045 [2.45]* 
The Netherlands * fully excluded 1.845 [1.59] 
Great Britain * fully excluded 0.106 [0.08] 
Ireland * fully excluded -1.366 [1.30] 
Greece * fully excluded -2.667 [2.70]** 
Spain * fully excluded -1.103 [1.07] 
Portugal * fully excluded -2.698 [2.51]* 
Past income (3 waves)   
Belgium * long-term income -2.062 [1.33] 
Luxembourg * long-term income -19.842 [14.13]** 
France * long-term income -5.335 [3.63]** 
Italy * long-term income 0.691 [0.59] 
Denmark * long-term income -3.251 [1.90] 
The Netherlands * long-term income -2.421 [1.91] 
Great Britain * long-term income -4.443 [3.40]** 
Ireland * long-term income -17.653 [16.70]** 
Greece * long-term income -3.036 [3.18]** 
Spain * long-term income -4.597 [4.64]** 
Portugal * long-term income -3.957 [3.89]** 
Pseudo-R2 0.518  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust estimator of variance  
Source: ECHP, Waves 1–3 (1994–1996). 
 
THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES IN EXPLAINING RESOURCES DEPRIVATION 
 
29
NOTES 
 
1 The version of the ECHP used at the time of the research (waves 1–3) did not include data for 
Sweden. Data for Finland are only available for the third wave of 1996. For Austria the data for the 
first wave of 1994 are missing. Hence, we have information for 12 countries stretching over a period 
of three years, from 1994 to 1996. 
2 The findings here corroborate largely the results of Layte et al. (2001) although the impact of 
country differences appeared much larger in their approach, probably due to the use of an 
unweighted deprivation index. 
3 Income was standardised using the modified OECD equivalence scale, which attributes a weight 
of 1 to the first adult, 0.5 to other adults aged 14 and older and 0.3 to children younger than 14. The 
poverty line was set at 50 percent of median standardised income. 
4 We use this measure because the standard McFardden pseudo-R2 makes no real sense for 
continuous and mixed discrete/continuous models such as the one estimated here because the log-
likelihood value can be positive or negative. 
5 Leisering and Leibfried (1999) have employed the term ‘biographisation of poverty’ to refer to the 
impact of life events which trigger, in particular, the occurrence of new, transient or temporal forms 
of poverty. This notion is, therefore, closely associated with the notion of the ‘risk society’ in 
modernisation theory elaborated, among others, by Giddens (1992) and Beck (1992), according to 
which individuals are increasingly confronted with risk and uncertainty by the emergence of a post-
traditional social order in response to which people adapt their life biography decisions and change 
their life-styles to cope with the rising ‘uncertainty’.  
6 ‘Social class’ also belongs to this category. The factor ‘social class’ is determined by income, 
socio-economic position and professional status. In this chapter, the focus is restricted to the 
underlying factors ‘income’ and ‘socio-economic position’. For an explicit treatment of ‘social 
class’ to explain deprivation, see Layte et al. (2001).  
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